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Abstract
Hierarchy is an efficient way for a group to organize, but often
goes along with inequality that benefits leaders. To control
despotic behaviour, followers can assess leaders’ decisions
by aggregating their own and their neighbours’ experience,
and in response challenge despotic leaders. But in hierarchi-
cal social networks, this interactional justice can be limited by
(i) the high influence of a small clique who are treated better,
and (ii) the low connectedness of followers. Here we study
how the connectedness of a social network affects the co-
evolution of despotism in leaders and tolerance to despotism
in followers. We simulate the evolution of a population of
agents, where the influence of an agent is its number of social
links. Whether a leader remains in power is controlled by the
overall satisfaction of group members, as determined by their
joint assessment of the leaders behaviour. We demonstrate
that centralization of a social network around a highly influ-
ential clique greatly increases the level of despotism. This is
because the clique is more satisfied, and their higher influ-
ence spreads their positive opinion of the leader throughout
the network. Finally, our results suggest that increasing the
connectedness of followers limits despotism while maintain-
ing hierarchy.
Introduction
The efficiency and stability of self-organized open systems
are strongly dependent on the agents’ capacity to sustain co-
ordination and cooperation. For instance, to build a new
structure, a group of robots need to decide of their respec-
tive roles such as harvester to get resources, manufacturer
to create the required parts and builder to assemble them.
Power suppliers and consumers within a smart grid have
to adjust the scheduling of production and consumption to
efficiently reduce power waste. Humans collectively de-
cide of rules to manage common resources and limit self-
ish behaviours. Whether it is in artificial or natural so-
cial systems, autonomous agents need to constantly take
collective decisions to coordinate complex tasks. Further-
more, collective decisions can also encompass the creation
and modification of crucial institutional rules that affect
group welfare e.g. rules governing the distribution of re-
sources; as in human societies (Ostrom, 1990; North, 1990)
or electronic self organized institutions (Pitt et al., 2012).
To cope with the complexity inherent of large scale coor-
dination, human societies tend to facilitate collective deci-
sion making by switching to hierarchy with a minority of
influential individuals i.e. leaders, and a majority of in-
fluenceable individuals i.e. followers (Hooper et al., 2010;
Powers and Lehmann, 2014; Perret et al., 2017). Similarly,
hierarchy has been shown to be highly relevant to artifi-
cial social systems by reducing the cost of organization
(Pugliese et al., 2015; Chih-Han et al., 2010). However, hi-
erarchy also implies an important cost. In human societies,
leaders tend to evolve despotic behaviour where they exploit
followers in order to increase their own resources (Mitchell,
1915; Carneiro, 1970; Hayden and Villeneuve, 2010). This
“iron law of oligarchy” ultimately leads to an overall reduc-
tion in the productivity of the group (e.g less production of
resources through collective action) (Summers, 2005). Evi-
dently, such behaviour should be avoided in an artificial so-
cial system. Yet, the mechanisms behind the evolution of
such despotism and inequality are still not fully understood.
Common explanations emphasize the importance of a sur-
plus of transmissible resources (Mattison et al., 2016), the
capacity of followers to avoid domination, or the ability of
leaders to impose domination (Johnstone, 2000; Summers,
2005). However, and as described by the famous quote of
John Acton: “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power
corrupts absolutely”, it has also been suggested that the sole
asymmetrical distribution of power is enough to lead to in-
equality and despotism. (Mitchell, 1915). Power can be de-
fined as the influence of individuals on collective decisions.
Leaders might exert this influence to leverage institutional
rules, and ultimately tilt the distribution of cost and benefits
toward their own advantage. But even if leaders have a huge
influence on collective decisions in hierarchical societies
(Gavrilets et al., 2016), their behaviours are constrained in-
directly by the satisfaction of the rest of the group. For in-
stance, an intolerable selfish leader could be, for the follow-
ers, worth the cost of overthrowing him. However, follow-
ers often lack direct knowledge of the leader’s behaviours
and decisions. To enforce such control, they judge decision-
makers by the state of the laws and rules they manage. In re-
sponse to too despotic rules, they can then start a revolution
to overthrow the leader. This form of justice, where individ-
uals judge how institutions and decision-makers treat them,
is defined as interactional justice (Schermerhorn, 2012), and
is a common way in which individuals exert control over
their institutions in natural social systems. Yet, the moni-
toring of institutions and a fortiori leaders is greatly depen-
dent on the individuals having knowledge of the state of the
system. This is because the agents first need to make a self-
assessment of how they are being treated, i.e. build their own
opinion from their personal experiences; and then make a
collective assessment about whether to try to induce change,
i.e. aggregate the opinions of other agents. Although this
kind of opinion formation based on individual and social
learning produces a global assessment of the current state
of institutions, it is also constrained by the knowledge ac-
cessible to individuals. Because of the size and complexity
of large human groups, this knowledge is often incomplete.
Indeed, leaders have a strong influence on followers’ opin-
ion. In addition, leaders are often surrounded by a clique –
a limited number of highly influential individuals, such as a
patriarchal clan in early agricultural societies (Kaplan et al.,
2009) or key policy-makers in contemporaneous communi-
ties (Miller, 1958). By providing them with preferential ac-
cess to resources, leaders can cause the clique to have a posi-
tive opinion, which they then spread throughout the network
as a result of their high connectedness. The opinion of fol-
lowers thus becomes biased by the clique, blinding them to
the actual level of inequality. This blindness limits the con-
trol of followers on the leader’s decision. In recent work,
Pitt (2017) modelled this process and has formally demon-
strated that a centralized social network with a leader and a
clique biases the transfer of knowledge, and ultimately leads
to misconceptions on the current fairness level of the soci-
ety. From this, it was predicted that an incomplete transfer
of knowledge could blind the interactional justice of follow-
ers and allow the evolution of despotic leaders. However,
this prediction has remained untested so far.
Here we address this by using an evolutionary model to
answer the following question: how does social network
structures affect the evolution of despotism in hierarchical
societies ? In the model, agents are explicitly organized in
a centralized network with the leader as the central node.
Agents are described by their preferences on the distribution
of resources, and their opinions on the actual level of fair-
ness in the society. We use a Moran process (Moran, 1958;
Lieberman et al., 2005) to simulate the evolution of their dis-
tribution preferences and study how the network structure
affects the level of despotism. Our results highlight a neg-
ative effect of centralization on the evolution of distribution
preferences, with more centralised networks leading to fol-
lowers accepting higher levels of despotism as interactional
justice becomes biased. But on the flip side, we show that
the level of despotism can be limited by increasing the con-
nectedness of followers. By doing so, interactional justice
becomes effective at constraining the leader, allowing the
benefits of hierarchy to be realized without the costs. Our
results contribute to the knowledge on the evolution of hier-
archy, institutions and justice, key concepts to understand
natural social systems and design artificial self-organized
system.
Model definition
To investigate the impact of social network structure on the
evolution of despotism, we have developed a model to sim-
ulate the evolution of distribution preferences within a hi-
erarchical society. This section provides an outline of the
model with a detailed description of the mechanisms imple-
mented: the network structure, the distribution of resources,
the interactional justice and the reproduction.
Model outline and life cycle
We consider a fixed-size population of N individuals ex-
plicitly organized in a directed network. The population is
composed of one leader deciding of the distribution of re-
sources and N − 1 followers. In addition, the population
is divided between Nc highly influential individuals called
clique members which includes the leader, and No individ-
uals with low influence called outgroup members . The life
cycle consists of:
1. The group produces an amount of resource that is dis-
tributed amongst group members according to the distri-
bution preference of the leader, zL (Equation 2).
2. Each individual builds its own subjective mindset about
the fairness of resource allocation,m, as a function of the
resources it personally received and its own distribution
preference (Equation 3).
3. Each individual builds its opinion about the overall fair-
ness of the resource distribution, o, by aggregating its own
mindset and the mindsets of the neighbouring individuals
(individuals linked to the focal individual) (Equation 4).
4. Each individual compares its opinion to its distribution
preference z. If the opinion is higher than the preference,
the individual is considered defiant and pays a cost to at-
tempt a revolution.
5. In case of a large proportion of defiant individuals within
the population, i.e. above a revolution threshold T , a new
leader and clique are chosen within the defiant individu-
als. The network is then rebuilt.
6. A random individual dies and is replaced by another indi-
vidual with a probability proportional to its fitness (Equa-
tion 5). This reproductive process is repeated R times.
Individuals are modelled by one cultural trait; their dis-
tribution preference z defined between equal (z = 0) and
strongly skewed (z = 1). In leaders, this trait zL is trans-
lated into the function defining the distribution of resources
with zL = 0 representing a fair leader and zL = 1 a despotic
leader. In followers, this trait is translated into their toler-
ance towards inequality, with the minimum z = 0 equal to
no tolerance and the maximum z = 1 equal to the max-
imum tolerance where any level of despotism is accepted.
The agents are also indirectly described by their influence α,
here translated into the probability that the focal node is con-
nected toward another individual. The trait z evolves follow-
ing a Moran process described in the reproduction section
(Moran, 1958; Lieberman et al., 2005). In addition, when a
new individual is born, its z trait can mutate at a rate µz.
When a mutation occurs, a random value is sampled from a
truncatedGaussian distribution centered on the current value
of the trait, with variance σz.
Network structures
To study how hierarchy can affect the evolution of despo-
tism, we explicitly describe the social structure of the pop-
ulation by a directed social network. In this network, each
node represents an individual and each directed link repre-
sents a social contact from one individual to another. We
define the in-degree and the out-degree of an individual as
the number of links connected respectively toward and from
this focal node. The influence of an individual is taken to be
its connectedness α defined as the probability of an individ-
ual to be connected toward another individual. To build the
network, we use an algorithm derived from the Erdo˝s–Re´nyi
model (Erdo˝s and Renyi, 1959) as follows:
1. The leader and all members of the clique are fully con-
nected.
2. For each individual, a directed link is created from the
individual i to the individual j following a probability αc
if the focal individual i is member of the clique or is the
leader, and αo if the focal individual i is a follower.
If a node is not connected to any individual at the end of
the algorithm, one link is added from that node towards a
randomly chosen individual. The network structure is then
described by the value of αc and αo. We consider a network
as randomwhen αc = αo, and as centralizedwhen αc > αo.
Distribution of resources
At each round, the group produces a fixed amount of re-
sourcesB = 2N . The resources are distributed as a function
of the social position si of the individual, with the social po-
sition of the leader, clique and followers being respectively
0, 1 and 2. The fitness wi(t) of an individual i at a time t is
equivalent to the resources received:
wi(t) = B ∗ f(si(t)) (1)
The function defining the distribution f(si(t)) is modulated
by the leader preference zL such that :
f(si(t)) =
e−si(t)∗zL(t)
∑N
j=1 −e
sj(t)∗zL(t)
(2)
The distribution of resources is normalized and is bounded
between an equal distribution of resources (with z = 0)
and a strongly asymmetrical distribution of resources (with
z = 1 ). We make the assumption that the leader has full
control on collective decision. This is a common assumption
in the literature on the evolution of despotism (Buston et al.,
2007).
Interactional justice
Each individual i has an opinion oi(t) describing its view of
the current fairness of the society. It is the result of its own
mindsetmi(t), which is calculated from its own personal ex-
perience, and the mindset of its incoming social neighbours.
First, an individual’s mindset is calculated by comparing the
resources it received with an egalitarian distribution:
mi(t) =
1/N − p(t)
1/N − pmin
(3)
The mindset is normalized by the difference between the
maximum share 1/N and the minimum possible share pmin.
As a result, the mindset is not dependant of the absolute
amount of resources producedB. The opinion oi(t) of indi-
vidual i is then calculated as:
oi(t) =
mi(t)L+
∑k
j=1mj(t)
ki(t) + L
, (4)
with j an incoming neighbour, ki(t) the in-degree of the fo-
cal node, andL a weight determining the relative importance
of its own experience compared to the mindset of neigh-
bours.
The variablesm and o are bounded between 0 (totally satis-
fied) and 1 (totally dissatisfied). An individual is considered
defiant if its opinion value is more than its tolerance thresh-
old zi(t). A defiant individual then pays a cost to attempt a
revolutionC. In case of a large proportion of defiant individ-
uals within the population, i.e. above a revolution threshold
T , the current leader and clique become outgroup members
and a new leader and clique are chosen from the defiant in-
dividuals. The network is then rebuilt.
Reproduction
We consider here the evolutionary process as only cultural
evolution (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). The evolution of the
population is modelled by a Moran Process (Moran, 1958;
Lieberman et al., 2005). This has been shown to be an ef-
ficient method to study evolution in finite populations and
keeps the size of the population constant. The reproduction
follows a death-birth process. At each time step, a randomly
chosen individual dies. Then, the vacant node is replaced
by the offspring of an individual chosen within the popula-
tion with a probability proportional to its fitness, i.e. fitness-
proportionate selection. The individual chosen to die is also
competing to fill the vacant node with one of its own off-
spring. More formally, the new individual has a probability
P (i) to be the offspring of individual i according to :
P (i)(t) =
wi(t)
∑N
j=1 wj(t)
, (5)
with N the population size, and j = 0 the individual pre-
viously occupying the node. We assume that a vacant node
can be replaced by any other individual in the population i.e.
the individual changing its distribution preference can learn
from the observation of any other individual. Because we
consider the opinion formation to happen on a longer time
scale than the evolution of cultural items, this process is re-
peated R times by generation.
Results
In this section we report our experimental results. To pro-
vide a comprehensive investigation of our research question,
we perform two analyses. In our first analysis, we consider
that only the leader expresses its distribution preference zL
and that followers’ distribution preference zf is fixed. Then,
we combine mathematical analysis and numerical simula-
tions to study the effect of the network structure e.g. αc and
αo on the evolution of despotism. In our second analysis,
we relax this assumption and use numerical simulations to
allow both leader and follower preferences to evolve. We
define the level of despotism as the level of inequality im-
posed by the leader which is here its distribution preference
zL.
Analysis 1: Evolution of despotism level with fixed
followers’ tolerance
We consider first that only the leader expresses z and that
followers’ distribution preference zf is fixed. The fitness of
the leader wL(t) is equal to:
wL(t) =
1
∑N
i=1 −e
si∗zL(t)
. (6)
It can be shown that:
dwL(t)
dzL
=
∑N
i=1 sie
−si∗zL
(
∑N
i=1 e
−si∗zL)2
> 0 (7)
In other words, an increase in the level of despotism zL al-
ways increases the fitness of the leader and should be posi-
tively selected. However, it can exist a value z∗ of the leader
trait zL between 0 and 1 for which the group undergoes
a revolution. In this case, the leader becomes a follower
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Figure 1: Mean value of the evolutionary stable point z∗ in
function of the connectedness of the clique αc and connect-
edness of the outgroup αo
and its trait z no longer affects the distribution of resources.
When the tolerance of followers is fixed, the distribution of
resources is the only selection pressure existing on z. Con-
sequently, the level of despotism zL will evolve towards the
stable point z∗ defined as the maximum value of z for which
a revolution will not occur. The value of this evolutionary
stable point is a function of the network structure, i.e. αc and
αo, for a given followers’ tolerance and revolution threshold.
Because it is not possible to analytically calculate z∗, we use
numerical simulations to determinate its value as a function
of αc and αo. The default parameters used in the simula-
tions, unless otherwise specified, are N = 500, Nc = 25,
L = 1, T = 0.1, zf = 0.25, R = 100. For each set of pa-
rameters considered, 100 independent simulations have been
realized. The results presented, unless otherwise specified,
are the mean value of replicates.
Figure 1.A demonstrates that centralization of the net-
work structure leads to a higher level of despotism z∗. The
greatest level of despotism z∗ = 0.71 is obtained for the
maximum αc and minimum αo; and the lowest level of
despotism z∗ = 0.35 is obtained for the minimum αc and
maximum αo. To better understand the contribution of each
variable, a statistical model has been built. To take in ac-
count the heteroskedacity inherent to the model, we built a
mixed linear regression model with αo as a random effect.
It shows that αc, αo and their interaction have a significant
effect on the level of despotism at equilibrium z∗ (p-value
< 1.10−6). Because the presence of significant interaction
limits the interpretation of the statistical model, a graphi-
cal representation is presented in figure 1.B and figure 1.C.
They show that αc has a linear positive effect on the level
of despotism while αo has a exponential linear effect on the
level of despotism. In addition, it also depicts a strong in-
teraction between the two variables with the positive effect
of αc on despotism being strongly dependent of the value of
αo. In other words, a more centralized system lead to higher
despotism only when followers are also disconnected from
each other. Therefore, it suggests that increasing connect-
edness of outgroup members is a efficient way to limit the
evolution of despotism.
Analysis 2: Evolution of despotism level and
follower’s tolerance
In our second analysis, we allow the tolerance of follow-
ers to evolve. Because of the complexity of the model, we
use numerical simulations to analyse the model. The results
of interest are the mean value of the distribution preference
z and the level of despotism defined as the leader’s value
of distribution preference zL. In addition, we present the
mean value of mindset m obtained from self-assessment,
the mean value of opinion o obtained from interaction with
neighbours, the mean value of bias defined as the difference
between m and o and the frequency of revolution events
within the population. Because of the presence of a muta-
tion operator, the system is an ergodic Markov Chain with
no absorbing states. Therefore, the result of interest is the
stationary distribution, which describes how long the sys-
tem spends in each state. To calculate this, we present the
average over long-run time over 5X107 generations by sam-
pling 50 data points every 1X106 time steps. This method is
confirmed as a good approximation of the stationary distri-
bution by the absence of a periodic pattern of cycles and the
standard error between simulations being always less than
0.027 . The default parameters used in the simulations, un-
less otherwise specified, are N = 500, Nc = 25, L = 1,
T = 0.1, R = 100, C = 0.1, σm = 0.01 and µ = 0.01.
The initial values of z are randomly generated. For each set
of parameters considered, 50 independent simulations have
been realized. The box plots represents the dispersion of
the mean value across time. The results presented as scatter
plots show the mean value of replicates and the error bars
represent the standard error between the mean value of repli-
cates.
Figure 2 confirms that increasing the connectedness of the
leader and its clique significantly leads to a higher level of
despotism zL, even when the distribution preference of fol-
lowers also evolves. Figure 2 shows that above 0.1, further
increasing the connectedness of the clique does not have a
significant effect. However, this plateau is explained by the
maximum limit imposed on the distribution preference z.
As before, this result is explained by the evolution of leader
distribution preference being controlled by the threshold at
which followers start a revolution and change the leader
and its clique. Figure 3 highlights the mechanism behind
the centralization effect: an increase in clique connected-
ness αc is translated into a higher negative bias of opin-
ions which leads to a lower frequency of revolution, and
ultimately a higher mean level of despotism. In addition,
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Figure 2: Long-run time averages over 5 X 107 generations
of the mean level of fairness z as a function of clique con-
nectedness αc. Grey circles represent the mean value of dis-
tribution preference of the leader zL. Results are compared
by pairwise Welch’s t-test (***: p-value< 1X10−6)
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Figure 3: Long-run time averages over 5 X 107 generations
of the mean mindset, mean opinion z and mean percentage
of revolution as a function of clique connectedness αc. Or-
ange bars represent the mean value of bias defined as the
difference between mindset and opinion.
Figure 2 demonstrates a similar positive effect of the con-
nectedness of the leader and its clique on the mean value of
distribution preference z. In other words, centralization lead
followers to be more tolerant to despotism. By deciding of a
more skewed distribution of resources, the leader increases
its fitness which causes its distribution preference to spread
in the population. This effect associated with the cost of
revolution leads to the mean value of distribution preference
being close to the leader distribution preference. It is also
worth noting that even in a random network and in absence
of bias, followers evolve a relative tolerance to despotism.
In addition, in contrast to the previous result, the model in-
cluding the evolution of followers’ preference has an overall
higher level of despotism. This result is explained by the
follower preference for equality being limited by the cost of
revolution and the necessity of having a threshold proportion
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Figure 4: Long-run time averages over 5 X 107 generations
of the mean level of fairness z as a function of outgroup
connectedness αo. Grey circles represents the mean value
of distribution preference of the leader zL.
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Figure 5: Long-run time averages over 5 X 107 generations
of the mean mindset, mean opinion z and mean percentage
of revolution as a function of outgroup connectedness αo.
Orange bars represent the mean value of bias defined as the
difference between mindset and opinion.
of individuals being in a defiant state at the same time. Fi-
nally, a close-up look at the simulations show that z strongly
vary because of succession of period of increasing despotism
and period of revolution. Indeed, the follower preference for
equality is dependent of the leader preference and leads to
chaotic variations. Despite this, the upper limit value of z
and its average on long-run time confirms the positive effect
of centralization on the level of despotism.
Figure 4 shows that increasing the connectedness of fol-
lowers leads to a lower level of despotism zL, even when
the distribution preference of followers also evolves. In ad-
dition, it demonstrates a similar effect on the mean value
of distribution preference z for the reason stated previously.
Both of these effects have been tested using a linear regres-
sion and are statistically significant (p-value < 1.10−6). It
is worth noting that the effect of the connectedness of fol-
lowers on the level of despotism is smaller in comparison to
the results where the tolerance of followers is fixed. How-
ever, Figure 5 confirms that increasing the connectedness of
followers greatly reduces the bias and therefore increases the
frequency of revolution in response to despotic behaviour. In
other words, the influence of the leader and its clique which
blind followers judgement is dependent of disconnected fol-
lowers. Therefore, the smaller effect of αo on the level of
despotism in this analysis is due to the other constraints af-
fecting the cost and benefit of revolution as stated in the re-
sults looking at the effect of αc . It suggest that the revolu-
tion mechanism also affects the evolution of despotism and
should be investigated in future work.
Discussion
Summary
Despite the potential benefits of the hierarchy, centralization
appears to go along with despotism, i.e. inequality enforced
by leaders. Yet, it is still hard to determine if inequality and
despotism are an inherent consequence of centralization or
the result of a common element. Although different factors
have been identified, the role of distribution of influence and
its impact on knowledge transfer has not yet been investi-
gated. To fill this gap, we have simulated such a scenario
by modelling the evolution of distribution preference in ar-
tificial societies structured in different social networks. The
model developed demonstrates that the centralization of so-
cial networks leads to the evolution of higher despotism and
inequality. In other words, an asymmetrical distribution of
influence is sufficient to create inequality. This result holds
when the tolerance of followers is fixed or in a more real-
istic set-up where tolerance of followers evolve. This result
is explained by the knowledge of followers on the leader’s
decision which is (i) biased by the influential members of
the clique, and (ii) limited by their low connectedness to
other followers. As a consequence, followers can’t impar-
tially enforce their control on leaders and a fortiori on col-
lectively decided institutional rules. Furthermore, the model
demonstrates that the effect of influential members on fol-
lowers’ opinion is strongly dependent on followers having
low connectedness. Indeed, a slight increase in the influence
of followers greatly reduces the despotism created by the
clique influence. However, as shown by comparing the first
and second analysis, this effect is weaker when follower’s
distribution preference is also evolving. Overall, this result
suggests that increasing the connection between followers
could be a solution to limit despotism in social systems.
Related work
The results presented here attempt to bridge the gap between
two main research axes. Previous research work has ei-
ther examined the impact of centralization on opinion for-
mation processes, but without evolutionary processes, or
has studied the evolution of despotism without integrating
mechanisms underlying opinion formation. On the former
side, Gavrilets et al. (2016) have shown that the presence of
highly influential individuals can strongly bias the collec-
tive decision. Later on, Pitt (2017) has integrated institu-
tional rules and interactional justice into a multi-agent sys-
tems and shown that hierarchy can bias the followers’ opin-
ion on leader decided rules. We have here confirmed that
this result still holds even when the evolution of individual
preferences for the distribution of resources are taken in ac-
count. Furthermore, we have shown that integrating the evo-
lution of followers’ preferences can lead to irregular level of
despotism but yet, with the same qualitative behaviours as
when only the leader’s distribution preference evolves. On
the other hand, reproductive skew theory used mathemati-
cal models to understand how the conflict between leader
and follower affects the evolution of despotism (Summers,
2005). These models have identified the important factors
behind the evolution of inequality such as the cost of leav-
ing the group or the relative cost of conflict with the leader.
Later on, evolutionary models have extended and confirmed
this work by taking in account many connected large groups
(Hooper et al., 2010; Powers and Lehmann, 2014). Our re-
sults complete this previous work by integrating an opinion
formation process and by identifying a new crucial factor
in the evolution of inequality: the distribution of influence
itself as modelled by social network structure.
On the whole, providing a complete explanation of the
evolution of group organization and complexity is a cru-
cial goal in research (Szathma´ry, 2015). The “iron law of
oligarchy” provides such a scenario by stating that (i) hier-
archy emerges when groups grow bigger as a consequence
of egalitarian organization becoming more costly, and (ii)
despotism appears as a consequence of hierarchy distribut-
ing political power asymmetrically. However, this scenario
is missing a micro-level explanation (Mitchell, 1915). The
model developed here has shown that an asymmetric distri-
bution of influence is sufficient to lead to despotism and in-
equality. Along the same line, previous work has shown that
this asymmetric distribution of influence tends to evolve in
large groups to reduce the cost of organization (Perret et al.,
2017). Taken together, this work draws a first outline of a
mechanistic description of the iron law of oligarchy.
Finally, our model predicts that the capacity of follow-
ers to efficiently control leader’s decision is crucial to limit
despotism. This result is supported by evidence from be-
havioural economics experiments. In particular, two eco-
nomics games called the ultimatum and the dictator game
implement a similar version of the presented model. In the
ultimatum game, one of two players has to decide how to
split a fixed amount of money and the second player can
choose to either accept it and both receive their shares; or
refuse it in which case neither receive anything. However,
in the variant called dictator game, the second player can’t
decide to accept or refuse. Experimental results show that in
the ultimatum game, the proposer keeps in average 60% of
the total amount while in the dictator game the share kept by
the proposer goes up to 72% (Oosterbeek et al., 2004; Engel,
2010). In conclusion, the ability of followers to punish the
leader reduces its tendency toward despotism. Importantly,
our results show that centralization of the social network can
blind the judgement of followers and transform the distribu-
tion of resources from an ultimatum game to a dictator game.
Assumptions and further work
We made a number of assumptions to keep our model
tractable. First of all, the model developed considers only
blind evolutionary processes as a driver of change in dis-
tribution preferences. However, cognitive processes might
also affect the evolution of agent preferences and lead to
a lower level of despotism e.g. followers predict that a
low level of despotism favour their positions. This differ-
ence suggests that integrating cognitive processes might be
crucial to limit despotism in artificial social systems and
would be worth investigating. Yet, it is important to note
that our results still hold over large time scales in which
blind evolutionary processes are a good predictor of cultural
change (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). Another assumption
made concerns the division of the society into only three
groups and with only one leader. In natural social systems,
hierarchy can be composed of many more layers. But this
is unlikely to change our qualitative results since the results
presented are explained by the asymmetrical distribution of
influence. Nonetheless, it is crucial to explore similarly the
evolution of despotism in other hierarchical network struc-
tures. Finally, we have considered here a simplified version
of the revolution process. Weingast (1997) have used a game
theory model to show that the cost of coordination required
to make a revolution would lead to either a fair society or a
strongly despotic one. In our model, this limit induced by
coordination is represented by the minimum amount of de-
fiant individuals required to start a revolution. Similarly we
find that society can switch from equality to strong despo-
tism, but we also show that groups might vary widely along
this range. In addition, our results demonstrate that this ef-
fect is affected by the structure of the social network. How-
ever, extending the current model to integrate more explic-
itly revolution as a Volunteer’s Dilemma game, along with
individual strategies for playing this game, could provide a
better insight on the evolutionary dynamics of despotism. In
particular, it could clarify the impact of follower’s connect-
edness on the evolution of despotism.
Conclusion
Social systems organised in hierarchy tend to develop into
despotism with inequality created by and for the leaders. It
has been proposed that the sole asymmetrical distribution
of power is enough to lead to such transition. In particular,
the leader and its influential clique could bias the opinion
of weakly connected followers, ultimately crippling the fol-
lowers’ capacity to control the leader’s decision. Yet, this
scenario was missing of a model integrating and testing ex-
plicitly these mechanisms. To fill this gap, we have devel-
oped a model integrating evolutionary processes, opinion
formation and interactional justice. We have used numeri-
cal simulations to investigate the impact of centralization of
the social network on the evolution of the level of despotism.
Our results have demonstrated that the centralization of a so-
cial network would lead to higher despotism and inequality.
It predicts that a transition from equality to despotism will
happen in presence of (i) highly influential individuals with
a preferential access of resources; and (ii) lowly connected
followers. In addition, our model demonstrates how a low-
level process such as opinion formation can strongly drive
the evolution of a higher property, here the group organiza-
tion.
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